Wright Line: An End to the Duel over Dual Motivation? by Elrod, Bradley C.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 32 | Issue 1
1981
Wright Line: An End to the Duel over Dual
Motivation?
Bradley C. Elrod
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Bradley C. Elrod, Wright Line: An End to the Duel over Dual Motivation?, 32 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 237 (1981)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol32/iss1/13
WRIGHT LINE: AN END TO THE DUEL OVER
DUAL MOTIVATION?
The National Labor Relations Board and the courts have employed various tests to
determine alleged violations of Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the National Labor
Relations Act when an employer' disc#7llnary action was motivated by both the em-
ployee'rpartic#oaton in protected activities and the employer' legitimate business
reasons. In an attempt to achieve 'substantive consistency, "the Board established a
new causation test in Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc. This Note
surveys the various modes of analysisfor examining causation which prompted the
Board's action. The Note then discusses Wright Line's potential to alleviate the
confusion existing at many levels of the decisional process. Finally, the Note. con-
cludes that due to unresolved questions concerning the appropriate burden placed on
the employer and the uncertain range of cases to which Wright Line will apply, the
Board may be thwarted in its attempt to achieve a uniform anayticalframework
INTRODUCTION
SECTION 8 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)l pro-
vides significant safeguards to employees engaged in union ac-
tivities. Generally, section 8(a)(1) prohibits employer interference
with employees' section 7 rights2 and section 8(a)(3) prohibits dis-
crimination based on union activity in the hiring or tenure of em-
ployees.3 Whether a violation of either of these sections is present
often depends on the employer's dual motivations.
A dual motivation case arises when employee discipline is mo-
tivated by discriminatory considerations, as well as by justifiable
1. NLRA § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976).
2. Section 8(a)(l) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer...
to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 7. . . ." Id. § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). Section 7 describes permissi-
ble employee labor activities:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-.
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a con-
dition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).
Id. § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). For a discussion analyzing the scope of § 7 rights, see
Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act, 115 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1195 (1967).
3. Section 8(a)(3) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer...
by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization ... !' NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)
(1976).
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business reasons.4  Traditionally, the National Labor Relations
Board (the Board) has distinguished dual motivation cases from
pretext cases. In a pretext case, an employer's asserted good
cause acts merely as a smokescreen for the employee's discrimina-
tory discharge.' Where alleged unlawful conduct involving a sec-
tion 8(a)(1) or 8(a)(3) violation turns on an employers' dual
motivations,' the Board has applied the "in part" test.' This test
provides that a discharge motivated in part by the employee's pro-
tected activities9 violates the NLRA, notwithstanding the em-
ployer's legitimate business justification.10
Congress charged the federal circuit courts of appeals with the
responsibility of reviewing the Board's administration of the
NLRA. 1" The circuits have failed, however, to agree on a uniform
standard of review. While almost half of the circuits have fol-
lowed the Board's in part test,' 2 the remainder of the circuits tra-
ditionally have required that the employer's anti-union animus be
the "dominant motive," or the "but for" cause of the discharge. 3
Additionally, three circuits have applied both the dominant mo-
4. For an indication of the type of conduct which may be considered just cause for
discharge, see F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How APBrRATION WoRKs 652-66 (3d ed. 1973)
(listing absenteeism, insubordination, fighting, falsifying company records, theft, incompe-
tence, use of intoxicants, obscene and immoral conduct).
5. Compare Calandra Photo, Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 660 (1965) (assumed that a smoking
violation is a valid ground for discharge, but held that the employer violated the NLRA
because the discharge was motivated partially by the employee's union solicitation activity)
with Wellington Mill Div. W. Point Mfg. Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 819 (1963) (while employer
claimed that the employee abused his privilege of leaving the work area, the employer's
knowledge of the employee's union activities, the severe nature of the punishment, and the
timing of the discharge led the Board to classify the employer's reason as pretextual).
6. See, e.g., Wellington Mill Div. W. Point Mfg. Co., 141 N.L.R.B. at 821.
7. If an employer punishes an employee for engaging in activity protected by § 7, it
violates § 8(a)(1), and if union activity is involved, § 8(a)(3) also is violated. Getman,
supra note 2, at 1198. See supra notes 3-4.
8. See, e.g., Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 224 N.L.1LB. 574 (1976).
9. For a detailed discussion of employees protected activities, see Cox, The Right to
Engage in ConcertedActiviies, 26 IND. L.J. 319 (1951).
10. Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 224 N.L.RB. at 575.
11. Section 10(e) provides in part:
The Board shall have power to petition any court of appeals of the United States
... for the enforcement of such order and for appropriate temporary relief or
restraining order .... Upon the filing of such petition, the court. . . shall have
power to grant such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and
proper, and to make and enter a decree enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as so
modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Board.
NLRA § 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976).
12. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
[Vol 32:237
DUAL MOTIVATION
tive and the in part test.' 4
Critical of the Board's in part test, the First Circuit,15 joined by
the Second Circuit,16 recently viewed the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Mt. Healthy City School Board of Education v. Doyle17 as
an affirmation of its but for analysis. In Mt. Healthy, the Court
held that once a constitutionally impermissible consideration is
shown to be a substantial factor in the school board's decision to
terminate an employee, the school board must be given an oppor-
tunity to establish that it would have reached the same decision
absent the protected conduct."1. The First Circuit's interpretation
of M. Healthy, as applied to employee discharge cases covered by
the NLRA, requires that "once the Board has shown a 'significant'
improper motivation, the burden is on the employer to prove that
it had a good reason, sufficient in itself, to produce the
discharge."'9
On August 27, 1980, the Board in Wright Line, A Division of
Wright Line, Inc. ,2 articulated a causation test in an effort to alle-
viate the intolerable confusion surrounding the mixed motive
analysis. The Board's approach, based on Mt. Healthy,"' provides
that once the General Counsel22 establishes a prima facie case of
unlawful motive, the burden shifts to the employer to show that
the discharge would have occurred irrespective of anti-union ani-
14. See infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
15. NLRB v. Eastern Smelting & Ref. Corp., 598 F.2d 666, 671 (1st Cir. 1979); Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 595, 606 (1st Cir. 1979) (Aldrich, J., concurring); Coletti's
Furniture, Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 1292, 1293 (lst Cir. 1977).
16. Waterbury Community Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1978).
See also NLRB v. Garry Mfg. Co., 630 F.2d 934, 949 (3d Cir. 1980) (Weis, J., dissenting)
(citing Mt. Healthy in support of the proposition that partial improper motivation is insuffi-
cient to establish a violation).
17. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
18. Id. at 287.
19. NLRB v. Eastern Smelting & Ref. Corp., 598 F.2d at 671 (quoting Mt. Healthy
City School Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 287).
20. 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980).
21. Id.
22. Once an unfair labor practice charge is filed in a field office, a field examiner
investigates the incident and makes a recommendation that the regional director either
issue a complaint or dismiss the charge. If the regional director decides to dismiss a charge,
the charging party may appeal to the Office of Appeals within the General Counsel's office
in Washington. If the regional director issues a complaint, the prosecutory apparatus of
the statute is activated. If the respondent refuses to settle the case, a formal hearing is
scheduled before an administrative law judge. The General Counsel is represented by a
lawyer who presents the case against the respondent. The General Counsel has the burden
of proof in all cases, which means that he or she must establish by reliable and sufficient
evidence that an unfair labor practice has been committed. F. MCCULLOCH & T. BORN-
STEIN, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 85-87 (1974).
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mus.23 The Board believes this mode of analysis is consistent with
congressional intent,24 Supreme Court precedent,25 and estab-
lished Board processes. 6
After years of disagreement over the proper analysis in mixed
motive cases, the First Circuit endorsed the Board's Wright Line
decision in Statler Industries, Inc. v. NLB.27 The court aban-
doned its traditional but for test and stated that "the Board and
we now seem to be on the same analytical track .... -18
Notwithstanding Statler, the First Circuit, considering Wright
Line on appeal,29 further refined the Board's analysis to require
the employer only to come forward "with credible evidence to re-
but or meet the General Counsel's prima facie case."" Thus,
under the First Circuit's view, the employer need only meet the
burden of production to escape initially an unfair labor practice
finding. The ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the
General Counsel, and the employer is not required to establish
that an unfair labor practice has not occurred.
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit, in NLRB v. Nevis Industries,
Inc. , accepted the Board's test unaltered. In support of its deci-
sion, the court noted that proof of motivation is most accessible to
the employer and that the NLRA's legislative history reflects con-
gressional intent to require employers to show just cause for em-
ployee discharge.32
This Note explores the controversy over mixed motive analy-
sis. First, it attempts to categorize the circuits prior to Wright Line
according to the tests applied and the respective burdens of proof
placed on the parties under each test.33 Next, the Note discusses
criticism of the in part test and the evolution of the M. Healthy
23. 251 N.L.R.B. at 1087-88.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 111-14.
25. Id.
26. See infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
27. 644 F.2d 902 (Ist Cir. 1981).
28. Id. at 906.
29. 662 F.2d 899 (lst Cir. 1981).
30. Id. at 904.
31. 647 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1981). As of the date of publication, two other circuits have
adopted the Board's test unaltered. See NLRB v. Charles H. McCauley Assoc., Inc., 657
F.2d 685, 688 (5th Cir. 1981); Peavey Co. v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 460, 461 (7th Cir. 1981).
Other circuits faced with the possibility of adopting the Board's test have neither approved,
rejected, or modified the analysis. See Charge Card Ass'n v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 272, 275 (6th
Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Permanent Label Corp., 106 L.R.R.M. 2211, 2216 (3d Cir. 1981);
NLRB v. Bums Motor Freight, Inc., 635 F.2d 312, 315 (4th Cir. 1980).
32. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
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test as interpreted by the circuit courts.34 The Note then examines
the Wright Line decision in light of the NLRA's legislative history
and Supreme Court precedent.35 Specifically, the Note focuses on
the contention that the First Circuit's traditional dominant motive
test is the appropriate analysis. 6 Finally, the Note discusses the
scope of Wright Line and its potential analytical implications.
37
Although the case decided the dual motivation issue, its applica-
bility to pretext cases and sections of the NLRA, other than sec-
tion 8(a)(3), remains unclear. The Note concludes with a
discussion of the Wright Line progeny, contrasting pre-Wrght
Line decisions with the analysis undertaken by the Board utilizing
the Mt. Healthy test.3
8
I. THE UNDERLYING CONTROVERSY
For several years, the Board applied the in part test when de-
termining whether the NLRA had been violated in a dual motiva-
tion case. In Consolidated Services,39 the Board reviewed the
discharge of a probationary employee who was a union adherent.
A fellow employee testified that the foreman said, in reference to
the discharge, that the employer "fired your buddy.. . because
he was head of the Union and a troublemaker."40 The Board held
that "a discharge motivated in part by an employee's exercise of
Section 7 rights is a violation of the Act even though another valid
cause may be present."'4 1 The in part language has been modified,
however, in other cases and includes "the motivating factor,"'42
"the substantial, contributing factor," 43 the "substantial cause,""
and "in substantial part. 45 While the Board maintains that the
underlying concept has remained intact,' the variations in lan-
guage have created conflicts between the Board and the circuit
courts, and confusion within some circuits. 47
34. See infra notes 64-88 & 202-06 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 111-21 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 124-47 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 148-94 and accompanying text.
39. 223 N.L.R.B. 845 (1976).
40. Id. at 845.
41. Id. at 845-46.
42. Tursair Fueling, Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 270, 271 n.2 (1965).
43. Erie Sands S.S. Co., 188 N.L.R.B. 63, 63 n.1 (1971).
44. Broyhill Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 288, 296 (1974).
45. Central Casket Co., 225 N.L.R.B. 362, 362 (1976).
46. Wright Line, A Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. at 1085.
47. See infra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
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In reviewing Board rulings, five courts of appeals consistently
have utilized the in part analysis or a variation thereof.48 The re-
maining six circuits, led by the First Circuit,49 traditionally have
applied a dominant motive or but for test. 0 Three of the circuits
which have applied the dominant motive or but for test also have
applied the in part test.5' Under the in part test, the General
Counsel has the burden of establishing that discriminatory consid-
erations played a part in the decision to discharge the employee.
Only if the employer rebuts the total inference of unlawful motive
will the discharge stand.52 In contrast, the dominant motive and
but for tests cast a much heavier burden on the General Counsel.
The dominant motive test requires the General Counsel to prove
that anti-union animus was the affirmative and persuasive reason
behind the employer's decision to discharge an employee. The
but for test places the burden on the General Counsel to establish
that, but for the employer's anti-union animus, the employee
would not have been discharged.53 Thus, in addition to the split
in the circuits concerning the appropriate analysis in mixed mo-
tive cases, the confusion in the area has been manifested by the
application of different tests within the same circuit.
The Fifth Circuit undoubtedly qualifies as the most flagrant ex-
ample of the reigning confusion. In addition to the dominant mo-
48. See Jim Causley Pontiac v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 122, 126 (6th Cir. 1980): "if the
discharge was motivated in part by protected activity, then a violation of section 8(a)(l) has
occurred"; Nacker Packing Co. v. NLRB, 615 F.2d 456, 463 (7th Cir. 1980): "suspension or
discharge is unlawful under the Act if it is motivated, even in part, by a desire to discourage
union activity"; Edgewood Nursing Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 363, 368 (3d Cir. 1978):
"[i]f two or more motives are behind a discharge, the action is an unfair labor practice if it
is partly motivated by reaction to the employee's protected activity"; MSP Indus., Inc. v.
NLRB, 568 F.2d 166, 174 (10th Cir. 1977) (violation of the Act depends on "whether there
was improper motivation in whole or material part"); Singer Co. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 172,
179 (8th Cir. 1970): "discriminatory treatment of employees by their employer, motivated
in whole or in part by their union or protected activities, violates § 8(a)(3) and (1) ....
49. See infra notes 61-86 and accompanying text.
50. See Waterbury Community Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90, 98 (2d Cir.
1978): "The magnitude of the impermissible ground is immaterial. . . as long as it was the
'but for' cause of the discharge ...."; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 539 F.2d
1335, 1337 (4th Cir. 1976): "The burden which is on the Board is ... to find an affirmative
and persuasive reason why the employer rejected the good cause and chose a bad one."
(quoting NLRB v. Billen Shoe Co., 397 F.2d 801, 803 (1st Cir. 1968)).
51. See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
52. Under Wright Line, once the General Counsel has established a prima facie case
of unlawful motive, the burden shifts to the employer to show that the same decision would
have been reached absent the protected conduct. See infra note 107 and accompanying
text.
53. For cases discussing the dominant motive and but for tests, see supra note 50.
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tive analysis, the court has articulated tests similar to the but for
or in part tests. In 1967, the court held that "the anti-union mo-
tive need not be dominant .... [A]ll that need be shown by the
Board is that the employee would not have been fired but for the
anti-union animus of the employer."54 In 1978, the court ruled:
"[T]he threshold for illegality is crossed if the force of invidious
purpose is 'reasonably equal' to the lawful motive prompting con-
duct."55 The court then added in a footnote: "In fact the threshold
for illegal motive may not require a 'reasonable equality,' but
may, according to some cases be met if invidious purpose ispart
of the decision at issue."'56  One year later, responding to the em-
ployer's evidence establishing just cause for the disputed dis-
charge, the court stated: "When this proof was made by the
Company, the burden shifted to the General Counsel to prove
that anti-union animus was the motivating cause of his dis-
charge."'57 The District of Columbia58 and the Ninth Circuits59
also have applied both the in part and dominant motive analyses.
The Board's in part test has met with considerable criticism.
The test's most ardent critic, the First Circuit, has argued that
under the Board's analysis there is a danger that the employer's
known desire to discharge an employee because of his or her
union activity "will be confused with, and substituted for, actuat-
ing motive."60 The court also has argued that the in part analysis
54. NLRB v. Whitfield Pickle Co., 374 F.2d 576, 582 (5th Cir. 1967) (emphasis
added).
55. NLRB v. Big Three Indus. Gas & Equip. Co., 579 F.2d 304, 315 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979) (quoting Cramco, Inc. v. NLRB, 399 F.2d 1, 6 (5th Cir.
1968)).
56. Id. at n.15 (citing NLRB v. O.A. Fuller Super Mkts., Inc., 374 F.2d 197, 200 (5th
Cir. 1967); NLRB v. American Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 74, 79 (5th Cir. 1965)) (emphasis added).
57. Florida Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 735, 742 (5th Cir. 1979) (emphasis added).
58. Compare Allen v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 976, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (discharge is unlaw-
ful if motivated in part by anti-union animus) with Amalgamated Clothing Workers v.
NLRB, 564 F.2d 434, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (unless the Board can show by affirmative and
persuasive evidence that an improper motive was the reason, management's decision must
stand) (quoting NLRB v. Billen Shoe Co., 397 F.2d 801, 803 (1st Cir. 1968)).
59. Compare L'Eggs Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir. 1980) (test, in
dual motivation cases, is which motivation is the moving cause behind the discharge) with
Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 1977) (existence of a
justifiable ground for discharge will not prevent such discharge from being an unfair labor
practice if partially motivated by the employee's protected activity).
60. NLRB v. Lowell Sun Publishing Co., 320 F.2d 835, 842 (1st Cir. 1963) (Aldrich, J.,
concurring). But see Klate Holt Co., 161 N.L.R.B. 1606, 1612 (1976) (recognition that the
mere fact that an employer may desire to terminate an employee because he engages in
unwelcome concerted activities does not, of itself, establish the unlawfulness of a subse-
quent discharge).
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ignores the employer's legitimate business reason, allowing the
militant union activist to behave as he or she chooses once anti-
union animus has been established.6" Finally, the court has stated
that the NLRA was not passed to encourage union activity-a
likely result if the employee's position is improved because of
union activities.62
While consistently criticizing the Board's analysis, the First
Circuit has modified its approach considerably in the past ten
years. In the early 1970's, the court applied the dominant motive
test.63 In 1977, the court viewed its traditional analysis in combi-
nation with the Supreme Court's decision in Mt. Healthy City
School Board of Education v. Doyle64 and adopted the but for
test.65 In Mt. Healthy, Doyle, an untenured teacher, challenged
the school board's refusal to renew his contract and award him
tenure.66 The school board's decision was influenced by Doyle's
lack of tact in handling professional matters.67 The court of ap-
peals, in affirming the trial court, held that because Doyle's consti-
tutionally protected conduct played a substantial part in the
school board's decision not to renew Doyle's contract, the dis-
charge was unlawful.68 The Supreme Court remanded the case,
stating that once it was shown that an unlawful consideration was
a substantial factor in the school board's decision, the school
board must be given an opportunity to establish that it would have
reached the same decision even in the absence of protected con-
duct.69 In reaching its decision, the Court reasoned that a rule of
causation which focuses solely on whether protected conduct
61. 320 F.2d at 842.
62. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 595, 602 (1st Cir. 1979). But cf. Ameri-
can Ship Bldg. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1964) (to redress the perceived imbalance of
economic power between labor and management, the NLRA conferred certain affirmative
rights on employees). It could be argued, however, that the NLRA, not the Board, places
employees in a better position by conferring these affirmative rights.
63. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fibers Int'l Corp., 439 F.2d 1311, 1312 (1st Cir. 1971) (Board
has burden of showing that the employer's dominant motive was anti-union animus).
64. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
65. Coletti's Furniture, Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 1292, 1294 (1st Cir. 1977) (the em-
ployer must show that the discharge would not have occurred but for the improper reason).
66. 429 U.S. at 276.
67. Id. at 282-83. The court offered the following two incidents as illustrations: Doyle
made an obscene gesture toward two female students and called a radio station to an-
nounce the high school's new dress code. Id The court, however, accepted the district
court's finding that the phone call was protected by the first and fourteenth amendments
since there was no evidence that Doyle violated any established school board policy. Id. at
284.
68. Doyle v. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 529 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1975).
69. 429 U.S. at 287.
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played a part in the decision not to rehire could place an employee
in a better position as a result of the exercise of protected conduct
than if he or she had done nothing.7" The Court also observed:
A borderline or marginal candidate should not have the em-
ployment question resolved against him because of constitu-
tionally protected conduct. But that same candidate ought not
to be able, by engaging in such conduct, to prevent his em-
ployer from assessing his performance record and reaching a
decision not to rehire on the basis of that record, simply be-
cause the protected conduct makes the employer more certain
of the correctness of its decision. 7
While the Court's reasoning bears some correlation to the First
Circuit's criticism of the in part test,72 the First Circuit's dominant
motive and but for analyses differ significantly from the test in Mt.
Healthy. Tinder the dominant motive framework, the General
Counsel must: (1) make a clear showing that the employer's dom-
inant motive was anti-union animus;"' and (2) rebut the em-
ployer's asserted business justification by establishing that the
discharge would not have taken place in the absence of the em-
ployee's protected activity.74 Under the but for standard, the
General Counsel must establish that the discharge would not have
occurred but for the anti-union animus.. 5 The test enunciated in
Mt. Healthy requires the General Counsel to establish that an un-
lawful consideration was a substantial or motivating factor in the
employer's decision to discharge the employee.76 Once this proof
is established, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate
that it would have reached the same decision absent protected
conduct.77
At first glance, the substantial or motivating factor require-
ment in Mt. Healthy implies a standard similar to the dominant
motive test.7" A companion case, however, suggests that the Court
70. Id. at 285.
71. Id. at 286.
72. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
73. NLRB v. Fibers Int'l Corp., 439 F.2d at 1312.
74. Id. at 1312 n.1.
75. Coletti's Furniture, Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d at 1294. The Board has criticized the
but for test because of the difficulty in singling out one individual cause; the Board warns
that the only logical way to apply a but for standard is to focus on the most recent event or
motive. Wright Line, A Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. at '1091 n.2 (citing W.
LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMiNAL LAW 249-51 (1972); W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS 238-39 (4th ed. 1971)).
76. 429 U.S. at 287.
77. Id.
78. But cf. Commissioner v. Kelley, 293 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1961). The court in Kelley,
1981]
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intended to rely on a partial motive standard. In Village ofArling-
ton Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp .,79 the
Court considered a challenge to a village's refusal to rezone an
area for multiple-family housing."0 Plaintiffs charged that the vil-
lage board of trustees' decision was motivated partially by the race
of the potential tenants in the proposed multiple-family dwell-
ings.8 ' The Court rejected the village's suggestion that the trust-
ees' action would only be questionable if it were based solely on a
discriminatory purpose.8 2 The Court noted: "Rarely can it be said
that a legislature or administrative body operating under a broad
mandate made a decision motivated solely by a single concern, or
even that a particular purpose was the 'dominant' or 'primary'
one."8 3 Furthermore, in articulating the test in M. Healthy," the
Court referred to Arlington Heights for its definition of motivating
factor:
Proof that the decision by the Village was motivated inpart by
a racially discriminatory purpose would not necessarily have
required invalidation of the challenged decision. Such proof
would, however, have shifted to the Village the burden of es-
tablishing that the same decision would have resulted even had
the impermissible purpose not been considered. If this were es-
tablished, the complaining party in a case of this kind no longer
fairly could attribute the injury complained of to improper con-
sideration of a discriminating purpose. In such circumstances,
there would be no justification for judicial interference with the
challenged decision.85
Thus, the M. Healthy requirement of a substantial or motivating
factor, as defined in Arlington Heights, appears only to require a
showing of partially unlawful motivation.
In 1979, the First Circuit further modified its approach by
reinterpreting Mt. Healthy's application to sections 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(3) of the NLRA. Despite the Supreme Court's apparent reli-
ance on a partial motive standard in Mt. Healthy and Arlington
in defining substantial part under § l17(m)(2)(A) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code,
stated that there may be two or more substantial parts. Kelley held that one-third of the
total net income to be derived from the property constituted "a substantial part." Id. at
912-14.
79. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
80. Id. at 254.
81. Id. at 268-71.
82. Id. at 265.
83. Id.
84. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 287.
85. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at 270-71
n.21 (emphasis added), cited in 429 U.S. at 287.
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Heights, the First Circuit required the General Counsel to show
"a significant improper motivation"86 before shifting the burden
to the employer "to prove that it had a good reason, sufficient in
itself, to produce the discharge."87 One month later, the court re-
manded a case to the Board with instructions that if the employer
"can demonstrate a substantial non-pretextual reason to justify its
conduct, then the Board has the burden of establishing that...
[the employer] would not have withheld vacation benefits but for
improper motivation."88 Consequently, the court appeared to
place the ultimate burden of proof back on the General Counsel
in contrast to its earlier interpretation of M. Healthy.
In addition to the controversy between the circuits concerning
the proper analysis in dual motive cases, disagreement exists re-
garding the compatability of Mt. Healthy with the objectives of
the NLRA. The second circuit89 has emphasized that the Mt.
Healthy but for test is needed to prevent action violative of the
NLRA.90 The court stated that unless the but for test is utilized,
an employee may be placed in a more favorable position as a re-
sult of his or her organizational efforts since, under the in part test,
the activist is placed in an almost impregnable position once anti-
union animus is established.9' Such a result violates the NLRA
by encouraging pro-union activity.92 While this argument has
merit, the court fails to recognize the shifting burden of proof ele-.
ment in the Mt. Healthy test. Under the second circuit's analysis,
the General Counsel must prove that but for the employer's anti-
86. NLRB v. Eastern Smelting & Ref. Corp., 598 F.2d 666, 671 (1st Cir. 1979).
87. Id.
88. NLRB v. Borden Inc., 600 F.2d 313, 321 (1st Cir. 1979).
89. Waterbury Community Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978).
90. Id. at 99. See also NLRB v. Garry Mfg. Co., 630 F.2d 934, 949 (3d Cir. 1980)
(Weis, J., dissenting) (citing Mt. Healthy in support of the proposition that partial improper
motivation is insufficient to establish a violation).
Although the second circuit characterized the At. Healthy approach as a but for test, a
more accurate description is the "shifting burden" test. There are two distinct burdens of
proof under At. Healthy. Initially, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that his or
her protected activities were a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant's decision.
Once plaintiff meets this burden of proof, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that
the same decision would have been reached absent the protected conduct. Arguably, the
defendant's burden is equivalent to a but for requirement. Labeling the entire analysis a
but for test, however, ignores the plaintiffs initial burden of proof. See generally Wolly,
What Hath Mt. Healthy Wrought?, 41 OHio ST. L.L 385, 392-93 (1980). Wolly argues that
the but for test is directed at the injury, not the violation: "The causation test is. only to
determine whether the proven violation Justitlies] remedial action."
91. 587 F.2d at 99 (quoting Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 285-
86).
92. Id.
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union animus, the employee would not have been discharged.93
Arguably, under Mt. Healthy, the employer must prove that the
discharge would not have taken place but for a legitimate business
reason.
94
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit is skeptical of the compatibility of
Mt. Healthy with the purpose of the NLRA.95 The court noted
that Congress, by passing labor laws, already established a bal-
ance which favors the employee.96 The Mt. Healthy standard
would restrike significantly the balance in favor of the employer
by allowing an employer to discharge an employee for discrimina-
tory reasons if the employer could establish that the same action
would have taken place absent the employee's protected conduct.
Such a test is contrary to congressional policy.97
A review of the circuits illustrates the substantive inconsisten-
cies which prompted the Board to articulate a unifying test.98 The
Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth circuits have followed
the Board's in part analysis.99 The Second and Fourth Circuits
have adopted the but for and dominant motive tests respec-
tively.t o The First Circuit has followed the dominant motive, but
for, ' 1 and slightly modified, Mt. Healthy tests." 2 The District of
Columbia and Ninth Circuits have utilized both the dominant
motive and in part tests. 10 3 Finally, the Fifth Circuit has applied
the in part, dominant motive, and but for tests." °
II. THE NLRB CAUSATION TEST
Against the backdrop of controversy and confusion, the Board
in Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc. '05 announced that
it will apply the Mt. Healthy test in cases involving section 8(a)(1)
or 8(a)(3) violations based on employer motivation. 6 The
93. Id. at 98.
94. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
95. Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 1245, 1265 (5th Cir. 1978) (Thornberry,
J., concurring).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 251 N.L.R.B. at 1085-86.
99. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
105. 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980).
106. Id.
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Board's causation test states:
First, we shall require that the General Counsel make aprima
facie showing sufficient to support the inference that protected
conduct was a "motivating factor" in the employer's decision.
Once this is established, the burden will shift to the employer to
demonstrate that the same action would have taken place even
in the absence of the protected conduct.' 7
In Wright Line, an employee, a leading union advocate, was
discharged two months after an election allegedly for violating a
plant rule against knowingly altering or falsifying production time
reports, payroll records, or time cards.' 08 The employee, known
by the employer's supervisors as the "union kingpin," had actively
solicited support for the union during two election campaigns.
During the second campaign, he was reprimanded by manage-
ment, allegedly for pressuring another employee to vote for the
union. The employer's anti-union animus was further manifested
by its anti-union campaign, which cast undesirable aspersions on
the union's sister locals and voiced concern about the company's
survival in the event of unionization. Moreover, the General
Counsel established that the employer had never discharged any
other employee under similar circumstances. The only employees
discharged for violating the rule embezzled and deliberately
forged records in the collection of fraudulent sales
commissions. °9
The Board held that the General Counsel established a prima
facie case based on the employer's hostility toward the employee,
the timing of the discharge, and the absence of prior consistent
discipline. The Board also found that the employer failed to sus-
tain its burden of proving that the discharge would have occurred
absent the employee's union activity. The Board noted that the
supervisor directed a "check" on the employee, although he had
107. Id. at 1089.
Notably, the burden of proof shifts to the employer once the General Counsel has es-
tablished a prima fade case. The employer's burden is to establish that the discharge
would have occurred regardless of the anti-union animus. The Board suggests viewing the
employer's asserted justification as an affirmative defense. Id. at 1084 n.5. Under the in
part test, the burden of proving unlawful motivation is on the General Counsel The em-
ployer's successful defense, however, is predicated on rebutting the total inference of un-
lawful motivation. See Adams Delivery Serv., Inc., 237 N.L.ILB. 1411, 1420 (1978)
(existence of valid grounds for discharge is no defense, unless such action was predicated
solely on such grounds and not by a desire to discourage protected activities).
108. 251 N.L.R.B. at 1090. Although the case is not specific, the factual setting indi-
cates a representation election.
109. Id.
2491981]
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no reason to suspect that the employee was untrustworthy. These
circumstances suggested a predetermined plan to discover a rea-
son for discharging the "union kingpin." 10
The Board's decision was supported by the NLRA's legislative
history and the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Great Dane
Trailers, Inc.1" Citing the 1947 amendment in section 10(c) of
the NLRA,1 2 the Board marshalled support for the shifting bur-
den test from the amendment's legislative history: "The original
House provision. . . was turned around so as to put the entire
burden on the employee to show he was not discharged for cause.
Under provision of the Conference report, the employer has to
make the proof.""13 The Board also noted that the Supreme
Court had placed the burden of establishing "cause" on the em-
ployer. In Great Dane, the Court stated that "once it has been
proved that the employer engaged in discriminatory conduct
which could have adversely affected employee rights to some ex-
tent, the burden is on the employer to establish that he was moti-
vated by legitimate objectives since proof of motivation is most
accessible to him."' " 4
Contrary to the Board's conclusion, it can be argued that Mt.
Healthy and the legislative history of the 1947 amendments to the
NLRA establish the validity of the first circuit's dominant motive
test." 5 In support of this argument, reference can be made to a
passage from the Report of the House Labor Committee which
concluded that "[t]he Board may not 'infer' an improper motive
when the evidence shows cause for discipline or discharge."' " 6
This passage, however, equally supports the Board's in part test.
Under the in part test, once the General Counsel establishes evi-
dence sufficient to support the inference that anti-union animus
110. Id.
111. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
112. Section 10(c) provides in part: "No order of the Board shall require the reinstate-
ment of any individual or employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the pay-
ment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause."
NLRA § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
113. 93 CONo. REC. 6678 (1947), reprinted in II NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr, 1947, at 1595 (1948).
114. 388 U.S. at 34 (emphasis supplied).
115. DuRoss, Toward Rationaliy in Discriminatory Discharge Cases: The Impact of Mt.
Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle upon the NLJ?4, 66 GEO. L.J. 1109, 1120-26 (1978).
But see supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
116. DuRoss, supra note 115, at 1123 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., Ist Sess.
43 (1947), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT R-
LATIONS AcT, 1947, at 334 (1948)).
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was a factor in the employer's decision to discharge the employee,
the inquiry then focuses on the employer's asserted business justi-
fication."I7 If the employer establishes the requisite defense-that
the discharge was motivated solely by legitimate business rea-
sons-the discharge stands."'
Further support for the validity of the dominant motive test
can be derived from the House report's change in the evidentiary
standard. 119 The new standard requires the Board to utilize a
"preponderance of the testimony" standard rather than the "all of
the testimony" standard. 2 ° While this amendment reveals an ef-
fort to counter the Board's practice of substituting expert infer-
ences for evidence, the amendment does not establish the validity
of the dominant motive test. Rather, the thrust of the report indi-
cates that the amendment was intended to encourage the Board to
articulate its decisions with greater clarity:
[Tihe Board decisions should show on their face that the statu-
tory requirement has been met--they should indicate an actual
weighing of the evidence, setting forth the reasons for believing
this evidence and disbelieving that, for according greater
weight to this testimony than to that, for drawing this inference
rather than that. Immeasurably increased respect for the deci-
sions of the Board should result from this provision. 12
The Board believes the Mt. Healthy test accommodates the
parties' competing interests while effectuating the policies and
objectives of the NLRA.'1 Under the Mt. Healthy test, the em-
ployee is protected because the prima facie case only requires a
showing of partially unlawful motivation. On the other hand, the
employer is protected by a formal framework within which to es-
tablish legitimate business reasons for discharging the
employee. 123
III. WRIGHT LINE'S ANALYTICAL IMPLICATIONS
The Board's causation test may quell much of the criticism di-
117. 251 N.L.R.B. at 1088.
118. See supra note 107.
119. See DuRoss, supra note 115, at 1123-24.
120. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 53-54 (1947), reprintedin 1947 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. Naws 1135, 1162.
121. Id. at 54.
122. 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089.
123. Id. While the employer clearly favors the dominant motive test due to the heavy
burden shouldered by the General Counsel, Wright Line also would be preferred over the
in part test because the employer does not have to rebut totally the unlawful motive infer-
ence. See supra note 107.
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rected toward the in part test. 24 A major objection to the in part
analysis centered on its failure to recognize employers' legitimate
business justifications. 125 Prior to Wright Line, once the General
Counsel established that anti-union animus played a part in the
decision to discharge an employee, the employer was forced to
rebut the total inference of unlawful motive. 2 6 This burden nec-
essarily required the employer to establish its exclusive reliance on
a legitimate business purpose. Thus, under the Board's traditional
analysis, even if anti-union animus played only a minuscule part
in the employer's decision, because a legitimate business purpose
was the major determinant, the discharge nonetheless would have
resulted in a violation of the NLRA.127
Under Wright Line, notwithstanding the General Counsel's
prima facie case of unlawful motive, the discharge is lawful if the
employer shows that the decision would have been the same ab-
sent protected conduct. The employer need not rebut the total in-
ference of unlawful motive. Accordingly, a discharge motivated
by anti-union animus may withstand Board scrutiny once the em-
ployer establishes that similar action would have taken place irre-
spective of the employee's union activities.
An additional criticism of the in part test was its propensity to
encourage union activity by placing the employee in a better posi-
tion as a result of union activities.128 This criticism loses much of
its vitality under the Wright Line approach. While protecting the
interests of employees engaged in concerted activity, Wright Line
provides the employer with a formal framework within which to
assert its business justification. 129 The employee, therefore, is not
placed in an unassailable position.1 30
The employer's burden of establishing that the same action
would have occurred in the absence of protected conduct' 3 ' sug-
gests that the employer's strongest case would be one which rests
124. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text,
125. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 107.
127. See address by John C. Truesdale, 1980 Labor Law and Labor Management Rela-
tions Conference, [1980] 4 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 9239, at 16,104: "[U]nion activities, even
if only the 'straw that broke the camel's back,' should not operate to deny employment to
even a marginal employee."
128. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. Under the in part test, once anti-union
animus is established, the employer's asserted business justification is ignored. See supra
text accompanying notes 125-27.
130. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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on evidence of prior consistent discipline in similar circum-
stances. 132 In application, however, this standard may be suscepti-
ble to potential problems.1 33 One such problem may arise if the
employer attempts to use established disiciplinary practice as a
pretext for an unlawful discharge. 134
In a pretext case, the only genuine motive is anti-union ani-
mus. The inquiry ends once an unlawful discharge is established
by the General Counsel's prima facie case. The Board, by consid-
ering the pretextual reason in the formal framework provided by
Wright Line for the employer's asserted business justification, may
give undue credence to a fabricated motive. There is a danger
that by continually considering the employer's asserted pretextual
justifications, the employer's fabricated reasons may begin to
carry weight as a legitimate justification.
Another potential problem arises when an employer's decision
cannot be viewed in light of past disciplinary practice. 35 One so-
lution would be to modify the second prong of Wright Line 36 and
evaluate the employer's action under the construct of a "reason-
able employer."' 37 Under this analysis, once the General Counsel
has established a prima facie case, the employer must prove that it
132. If the employer's actions exhibit disparate treatment of employees, these distinc-
tions must be justified. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOuRu, supra note 4, at 643-44. "[A]U
employees who engage in the same type of misconduct must be treated essentially the same
unless a reasonable basis exists for variations in the assessment of punishment ....
133. See 251 N.L.R.B. at 1083 (Jenkins, concurring). Member Jenkins voiced his con-
cern that the shifting burden analysis may prove to be inadequate in application, thus
requiring modification. Jenkins' concurring opinion, however, did not explicate the poten-
tial problem areas.
134. Although the Board indicated that the Mt. Healthy test will apply to pretext cases,
Wright Line concerned only the dual motivation issue. 251 N.L.R.B. at 1083. The Board
suggests viewing the employer's asserted justification as an affirmative defense. In the
Board's view, a pretext case is one in which the employer's affirmative defense is wholly
without merit. A dual motivation case arises when the affirmative defense has some merit.
The issue then becomes one of sufficiency ofproof Id. at 1084. The Board concludes'that
under the M. Healthy test, there is no need to distinguish between pretext and dual motive
cases. Id. at 1089.
135. This problem could arise when an employer is a relatively new concern without an
established pattern of discipline or nondiscipline.
136. The basic inquiry would remain the same: whether the employer's decision would
have been the same absent protected conduct. Instead of evaluating.the decision in light of
past practice, however, the focus would be on whether a reasonable employer's decision
would have been the same absent protected conduct.
137. Cf. Note, Can Negligent Representation Be Fair Representation? An Alternative Ap-
proach to Gross Negligence Analysis, 30 CAsE W. RIs. L. REv. 537 (1980) (union's duty of
fair representation should be evaluated under the construct of a reasonable union with
respect to procedural functions, such as filing grievances and notifying employees of any
action taken).
19811
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acted as any reasonable employer would have acted under similar
circumstances. Presumably, the employer would present evidence
of disciplinary practices taken by other employers similarly situ-
ated.1 38 Cases of gross misconduct, such as physical assault, are
impermissible in any employment situation and are evaluated
with relative ease. Problems may arise, however, where the em-
ployer typically expends significant time and financial resources in
training an employee. Depending on production strategy, one
employer may be willing to overlook noncompliance with plant
rules to protect his or her investment in the employee. Alterna-
tively, an employer whose production strategy depends on highly
efficient employees may demand strict compliance with plant
rules. Evaluating the latter employer's action in light of the for-
mer's past practice may yield an inconsistent result.
Wright Line's focus on employers' prior consistent behavior
may alert employers to the importance of promulgating a precise
disciplinary system and informing the employees of the system.
In the event of a challenged discharge, the employer could intro-
duce evidence of its disciplinary policy and the means by which
the employees had access to such policy.139 The employer then
would establish that the rules had been applied consistently in the
past. By encouraging an environment in which employees are
aware of the employment ground rules, Wright Line may alleviate
problems arising from the lack of employer/employee communi-
cation, thereby improving employer/employee relations.
Although the Wright Line analysis applies to sections 8(a)(1)
and 8(a)(3),140 a lingering question remains concerning the
Board's position on the applicability of the test to other NLRA
sectigns. On November 4, 1980, the General Counsel issued a
memorandum which attempted to clarify the scope of Wright
Line's application.141 The memorandum lists two categories of
cases in which Wright Line would not apply. Both categories in-
138. Some factors which may be considered in determining whether employers are sim-
ilarly situated include their line of business, amount of training on the job, ease or difficulty
in finding and retaining competent employees, financial resources, and fringe benefits.
139. Posting a set of rules in conspicuous areas of the plant is the most reliable means
of employee access. See, eg., Sanford Dress Corp., 123 N.L.R1B. 1106, 1108 (1959) (Board
ordered employer to post cease and desist notices in conspicuous places). Cf. Section
711(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: "Every employer. . . shall post and keep posted in
conspicuous places upon its premises where notices to employees . . . are customarily
posted ... the pertinent provisions of this subchapter and information pertinent to the
filing of a complaint." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-10 (1976).
140. 251 N.L.R.B. at 1083.
141. Memorandum on NLRB's Dual-Motivation Case, [1980] 4 LAB. L. RP. 9242, at
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volve situations where violations are established notwithstanding
the employers' motive. Employer conduct "inherently destructive
of important employee rights" is an example of such a situation.
42
Another example is where the employer refuses to reinstate a
striker when an open position is available. 43
The memorandum proceeds to name three areas involving a
motive analysis which the regional offices are instructed to submit
to the Division of Advice'" and concludes with a discussion of the
evidentiary standard to be utilized in determining whether the
employer has satisfied its burden of proof. The General Counsel
suggests that only when the employer "clearly establishes" its de-
fense will the charge be dismissed.14 Arguably, this observation
recognizes that employers no longer have to rebut the total infer-
ence of unlawful motive." Rather, employers must establish
clearly that the same decision would have been reached absent
protected conduct. '47
To summarize, Wright Line seems to represent a significant
pro-management decision. Employers motivated by anti-union
animus are insulated from liability if they can prove that their ac-
tions would have been the same absent protected conduct. The
decision appears to place primary emphasis on the employer's
right to rely on a system of consistent disciplinary practices. In
effect, the employer's past behavior in similar circumstances may
be determinative in evaluating a discharge. Several areas remain,
however, in which the applicability of Wright Line is uncertain.
16,119 (Gen. Counsel Memo. 80-58, Nov. 4, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum an
NLRB's Dual-Motivation Case].
142. Id. at 16,120. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc. 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967).
See, eg., A.S. Abell Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 802 (1978).
143. Memorandum on NLRB's Dual Motivation Case, supra note 141, at 16,120. See,
ag., Poultry Packers, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 250 (1978).
144. Memorandum on NLRB's Dual Motivation Case, supra note 141, at 16,120-21.
"A Division of Advice provides guidance to regional offices in cases concerning new or
unusually complex issues." E. MCCULLOUGH & T. BORNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 80. The
first area involves § 8(a)(4) cases which turn on motive. The General Counsel noted that
because there are special considerations which apply to these cases, the applicability of
Wright Line is unclear. The second area concerns §§ 8(a)(1)(A) and 8(a)(2) cases where a
union, with mixed motivations, causes an employer to take action against an employee.
The General Counsel requires these cases to be submitted to the Division of Advice when
there is evidence supporting both a prima facie case and the employer's asserted justifica-
tion. Similarly, in fair representation cases in which a prima facie case is established, but
in which there also is evidence supportive of the employer's asserted justification, the Gen-
eral Counsel requires the case to be submitted to the Division of Advice.
145. Memorandum on NLRB's Dual Motivation Case, supra note 141, at 16,121.
146. See supra note 107.
147. Id.
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IV. WRIGHT LINE's PROGENY
The relative paucity of decisions since Wright Line makes it
difficult to forecast the decision's practical effect on subsequent
Board rulings, 4 ' the opinions of administrative law judges, 149 and
court of appeals decisions. 50 Since the post- Wright Line cases fail
to offer an in-depth analysis under the new framework,'' this
Note analyzes pre- Wright Line Board decisions under the new test
and compares the hypothesized results with the post-Wright Line
decisions.
A. Retroactive Wright Line
The following cases highlight the potential differences between
the in part and Wright Line analyses. In Calandra Photo, Inc., 5 12
the dischargee was caught smoking after several warnings that it
was against the rules and that he might be fired as a result. The
employee also was involved in union soliciting of which the em-
ployer was aware. The employer alleged that the discharge was
based on the smoking violation.' 53 The Board affirmed the ad-
ministrative law judge's finding that even assuming the smoking
violation constituted valid grounds for discharging the employee,
it was no defense to a violation of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3),
unless the discharge was predicated solely on that ground.'5 4 This
statement is no longer valid under a Wright Line analysis. Under
148. One may hypothesize, however, that more decisions will be rendered in favor of
the employer since the employer's burden is less stringent than under the in part test. See
supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
149. Administrative law judges are officers appointed by the Board to preside over un-
fair labor proceedings and make recommendations of law and fact to the Board. E. Mc-
CULLOUGH & T. BORNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 84.
150. See Sullair P.T.O., Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 500,504 (7th Cir. 1981): "In our view,
the above cited authorities [Boaz Spinning Co. v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1968)]
control the disposition of this case .... See Mi. Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 287.. .; Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc., 251 NLRB No. 150 (Au-
gust 27, 1980)." See also NLRB v. Permanent Label Corp., 106 L.R.R.M. 2211, 2216 (3d
Cir. 1981) (in affirming the administrative law judge's finding that the employee's reason
was pretextual, the court cited Wright Line); NLRB v. Burns Motor Freight, Inc., 635 F.2d
312, 315 (4th Cir. 1980) (court refused to consider whether Wright Line was the appropri-
ate test).
151. Herman Bros., 252 N.L.R.B. 849 (1980); Taylor-Dunn Mfg. Co., 252 N.L.R.B. No.
118 (Sept. 30, 1980), [1980] 5 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 17,474; Behring Int'l, Inc. 252
N.L.R.B. No. 55 (Sept. 30, 1980), [1980] 5 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 17,447.
152. 151 N.L.R.B. 660 (1965).
153. Id. at 664.
154. Id. at 665.
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Wright Line, the discharge would stand, even if it were motivated
partially by anti-union animus, as long as the employer could es-
tablish that the discharge would have occurred notwithstanding
the employee's protected conduct.' The employer's case would
be weakened by evidence indicating that the no smoking rule was
not strictly enforced and that no measures were taken against
other violating employees.' 56
In Wood Transformers, Inc., the dischargee led the union's or-
ganizational movement.'" 7 After being disciplined for her tardi-
ness, she continued to report late and was absent twice.' 5 8 The
employer requested an explanation of her attendance record
which she failed to provide. Although the employer knew of the
employee's union activities, some disciplinary action was taken
before the employer became aware of those activities. The Board
approved the administrative law judge's finding that the employee
was discharged for her union leadership role and failure to report
to the employer concerning tardiness. The discharge was held un-
lawful since it was motivated in part by anti-union animus.159
Applying Wright Line, the employer's case could be strengthened
with evidence that other employees had been discharged for gross
insubordination. 60 Moreover, the employer might sustain its bur-
den of proof under Wright Line with evidence showing the em-
ployee's continued poor attendance and her refusal to heed
repeated warnings. In addition, the employer's case would be
strengthened by proof that disciplinary procedures were begun
before the employer became aware of the employee's union
activities.
In Wellington Mill Division West Point Manufacturing Co., 16
the dischargee, a model employee with nineteen years seniority,
was attempting to organize a union. 62 Within one month, the
employer reprimanded the employee for allegedly failing to in-
spect cloth. Later, the employee was fired for abusing the privi-
155. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
156. 151 N.L.R.B. at 665. The absence of prior consistent disciplinary action by the
employer could be fatal to this case. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
157. 226 N.L.R.B. 1112 (1976).
158. Id. at 1116.
159. Id.
160. Id. See, eg., American Can Co., 57 Lab. Arb. 1063, 1064 (1971) (employee's re-
peated refusals to report to the employer's office without the union representative held to
be grounds for a two-week suspension based on the employee's gross insubordination).
161. 141 N.L.R.B. 819 (1963).
162. Id at 834.
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lege of leaving his loom without permission. 63 The Board
classified the employer's rationale for discharging the employee as
pretextual 64 for the following reasons: (1) the employer's knowl-
edge of the employee's union activities;165 (2) the timing of the
discharge;' 66 (3) the severe nature of the punishment; 67 (4) the
supervisor's admission that he had orders to dismiss the em-
ployee; 168 and (5) the fact that no employee had been discharged
for similar offenses. 16 9
Even under Wright Line, it is unlikely that an employer would
prevail based on the factors cited in Wellington. The General
Counsel's strong prima facie case would require the employer to
establish an equally strong case based on genuine, non-pretextual,
reasons for the discharge.
This brief retrospective analysis suggests that the Wright Line
test may yield different results than the Board's previous in part
analysis. Under Wright Line, the employee no longer occupies an
"almost impregnable position" once anti-union animus is estab-
lished 170 because the employer need not rebut the total inference
of unlawful motive. The discharge, therefore, will stand if the em-
ployer demonstrates that the same action would have resulted ir-
respective of anti-union animus.
1 71
B. Post-Wright Line
The following cases illustrate the Board's application of the
Wright Line analysis. In Russ Togs, Inc., 172 two employees filed
grievances stating that they were not receiving the wage rate es-
tablished in their collective bargaining agreement and urged other
employees to file grievances. After learning of their action, the
employer began harassing the two employees. Shortly after wages
were increased to the contract level, the employees were laid
off. 173
163. Id.
164. Id. at 821. Wright Line may eliminate the distinction between dual motive and
pretext cases. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
165. 141 N.L.R.B. at 835.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 836.
168. Id. at 835.
169. Id. at 836.
170. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 126-39 and accompanying text.
172. 253 N.L.R.B. 767 (1980).
173. Id.
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The General Counsel's prima facie case was based on the em-
ployer's harassment and surveillance of the employees who had
filed grievances.174 The employer's justification alleged that the
two employees were urging other employees to engage in a slow-
down.'7 5 The Board relied on two factors in determining that the
employer failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the same
action would have taken place even in the absence of the pro-
tected conduct. First, the employees were not laid off until after
the employer raised the wages in accordance with the contract. 17
6
Second, the employer gave shifting reasons for the layoffs. 177 The
employer initially justified the layoff because of lack of work. The
employer later claimed that the two employees had intimidated
another worker. Finally, the reason asserted was the employees'
attempt to initiate a slowdown.
171
In Red Ball Motor Freight, Ine.,179 the dischargee complained
about the forced use of vacation time and the manner in which
laid off employees were recalled, and thus, urged other employees
not to start work early.'18  The Board held that the General Coun-
sel established a prima facie case by showing that the employer
relied on the employee's protected conduct as a ground for its ac-
tion.8 " Although the employer alleged that the discharge was
based on the employee's tardiness and poor attitude, the Board
found that the employer failed to meet its burden of proof under
Wright Line.12 The Board based its finding on three factors: (1)
the employer's statement that the employee's conduct was part of
a "chain of events" which brought her under surveillance; (2) the
employer's testimony that while he watched the employee's alleg-
edly disruptive behavior, he made no attempt to stop her; and (3)
the fact that an earlier, more disruptive incident caused by an-
other employee resulted in only a one day suspension.183
In Overnite Transportation Co. ,l"4 the administrative law judge
174. Id. at 768.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. 253 N.L.RB. 871 (1980).
180. Id. at 872.
181. Id. The complaints were protected activity since the employee had "the welfare of
her co-workers in mind." Id. at 871.
182. Id. at 872.
183. Id.
184. 254 N.L.R.B. No. 11 (Jan. 14, 1981), [1981] 5 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 9117,777 at
28,658.
259
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found the discharge of four employees unlawful.185 The Board
affirmed three of the violations because the employer failed to
demonstrate any legitimate justifications to support the dis-
charges. The administrative law judge found that the violation of
the safety rule by the fourth dischargee was a legitimate basis for
disciplinary action. The judge concluded, however, that but for
the employee's union activity the employer would not have dis-
charged him.'86 The Board affirmed, stating that the administra-
tive law judge's analysis "is in harmony with the analytical
objectives of Wright Line."'87
Another employee was discharged for allegedly punching the
timecard of a friend and fellow employee. 8 The Board found
that the employer knew of their friendship as well as their support
for the union." 9 The Board concluded that the discharge was un-
lawfully motivated by anti-union animus based on the following
evidence: (1) the employer did not have a policy of discharging
employees for a first time offense of punching another's time-
card; 9 ' (2) no employee had ever been discharged for such an
offense;19 ' (3) employees regularly punched time cards for fellow
workers; 9 2 and (4) the discharge occurred only three weeks after
the union began its organizational drive. 19 3
While these three cases fail to exhibit any startling revelations,
they are instructive. The cases suggest that the Board will con-
tinue to scrutinize rigorously the employer's asserted justification.
The employer's knowledge of protected activity, the timing of the
discharge, past practice with regard to disciplinary action, and
employer conduct preceding the discharge continue to weigh
heavily in the Board's analysis of dual motivation cases. Finally,
the Wright Line progeny does not indicate a shift toward favoring
the employer in such cases.1
94
185. Id. at 28,662.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 28,665 n.6. Presumably, since the employee's union activities were the but
for cause of the discharge, the employer failed to establish that the same decision would
have resulted absent the protected conduct. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
188. [1981] 5 LAB. L. REP. at 28,661.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 25,663.
191. Id. at 25,664.
192. Id. at 25,663.
193. Id. at 25,664.
194. See supra notes 125-33 and accompanying text.
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C. So What's All the Fuss About?
Although, theoretically, Wright Line represents a significant
pro-management decision, 195 a strong argument may be made that
in practice, the balance maintained by the in part test will remain
unchanged. The Board noted in Wright Line that "while the
Board's process has not been couched in the language of Mt.
Healthy, the two methods of analysis are essentially the same."'196
In addition, former Board Member Truesdale made the following
comments in a speech before the 1980 Labor Law and Labor-
Management Relations Conference:
Some readers of the Board's opinion in Wright Line will won-
der what all the fuss is about. The case does not change the
Board's traditional allocation of the burden of proof, nor is it
likely to alter the standards by which the Board determines
whether a litigant has carried its burden of proof. The major
contribution of the case, we hope, is that it will set forth more
clearly the burden on each party and provide the Board with an
analytical framework within which to discuss the extent to
which the parties' respective burdens have been carried.' 97
The fuss, however, may concern the judicial interpretation of a
recent Supreme Court decision which arguably undercuts the
shifting burden analysis as articulated in Wright Line. In Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,198 the Court held
that in Title VII cases, "when the plaintiff has proved aprimafa-
cie case of discrimination, the defendant bears only the burden of
explaining clearly the nondiscriminatory reasons for its ac-
tions."' 99 Under'Burdine, "the defendant need not persuade the
court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons," 2"
whereas under Wright Line the employer must explain the nondis-
criminatory reasons for the discharge and establish that the deci-
sion would have been the same absent the unlawful
considerations. The employer's burden under Wright Line implic-
itly requires the employer to persuade the trier of fact that it actu-
ally was motivated by legitimate business reasons.
It is arguable, however, that in a Title VII case, the plaintiff
has a lighter burden of establishing a prima facie case than under
Wright Line. Under Title VII, the plaintiff must show:
195. See supra notes 24-34 and accompanying text.
196. 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1088.
197. Address by John C. Truesdale, supra note 126, at 16,105.
198. 49 U.S.L.W. 4214 (March 3, 1981).
199. Id. at 4217.
200. Id. at 4216.
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(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and
was qualified for a job which the employer was seeking appli-
cants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications he was rejected; and
(iv) that after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of com-
plainant's qualifications.20'
The plaintiff is not required to establish subjectively that the de-
fendant was discriminatorily motivated. Since the burden on the
plaintiff in a Title VII case is lighter than the burden on the Gen-
eral Counsel under Wright Line, the corresponding burden on the
defendant is necessarily lighter under Title VII.
Consistent with Burdine, the First Circuit, on appellate review
of Wright Line, clarified the Board's shifting burden analysis. In
NLRB v. Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc. ,202 the court
endorsed the test articulated by the Board but limited the em-
ployer's burden to a "burden of going forward to meet a prima
facie case, not a burden of persuasion on the ultimate issue of the
existence of a violation. ' 20 3 The court distinguished Mt. Healthy
by noting that in that case, the employer conceded an improper
discharge of plaintiff for exercising constitutionally protected
rights. Unlike the typical labor case, the employer in Mt. Healthy
raised an affirmative defense which went to the propriety of the
remedy rather than to the existence of a violation. In the typical
labor case, the employer vigorously disputes the alleged reason for
the discharge. The employer's claim, however, is not an affirma-
tive defense. 204 Rather, the General Counsel's prima facie case
establishes a presumption that the employer committed an unfair
labor practice. While the employer must meet the burden of pro-
ducing evidence of a legitimate reason for the discharge, the bur-
den of persuasion remains with the General Counsel on the issue
of causation based on the alleged improper motive.
In contrast to the First Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, in NLRB v.
Nevis Industries, Inc., 205 accepted the Board's Wright Line test
without alteration. Although the question of production or per-
suasion burdens was not a focus of the Ninth Circuit opinion, the
court marshalled support for the Wright Line test by noting the
legislative history, which manifests an intent to require the em-
201. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
202. 662 F.2d 899 (Ist Cir. 1981).
203. Id. at 905.
204. See supra note 107.
205. 647 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1981). See NLRB v. Charles H. McCauley Assoc., 657 F.2d
685, 688 (5th Cir. 1981); Peavey Co. v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 460, 461 (7th Cir. 1981).
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ployer to show just cause for employee discharges,2" 6 and by fur-
ther acknowledging that proof of motivation is most accessible to
the employer. These justifications could be viewed as a recogni-
tion that the employer shoulders the burden of persuasion in es-
tablishing a legitimate business reason for the discharge. The fuss,
therefore, may concern the circuit courts of appeals' interpretation
of Wright Line.
In distinguishing between the burdens of production and per-
suasion, it must be noted that the production burden placed on the
employer by the First Circuit significantly favors the employer's
case. Under the in part test, once the General Counsel showed
that the employer's decision to discharge was motivated in part by
anti-union animus, the employer lost unless it could establish that
the only reason for the discharge was a legitimate business pur-
pose. 0 7 Under the Board's new test, the employer need not rebut
the total inference of unlawful motive, but must show that the dis-
charge would have occurred irrespective of anti-union animus. It
could be argued that since the employer now has a less onerous
case to establish, the employer should be required to meet the bur-
den of persuasion in establishing reasons sufficient for discharging
an employee. Otherwise, any reasonable evidence of a possible
legitimate business purpose might ultimately defeat the General
Counsel's case.
In contrast, the post-Wright Line Board cases have not indi-
cated a shift in balance favoring the employer.20 8 If, in fact, the
courts choose to deviate from the Board and strike the balance in
favor of the employer, then the question becomes whether the
Board's test as applied by the courts is consistent with congres-
sional policy. The primary purpose of the NLRA was to redress
206. 647 F.2d at 909.
207. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
208. In none of the post- Wright Line decisions in which the General Counsel has estab-
lished a prima facie case has the employer been successful in meeting its burden. See
Overnite Transportation Co., 254 N.L.R.B. No. 11 (Jan. 30, 1981), [1980] 5 LAB. L. REP.
(CCH) 17,777; Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. No. 111 (Jan. 9, 1981), [1980]
5 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 9117,728; Russ Togs, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (Jan. 9, 1981), [19801
5 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 117,726; Joshua's, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. No. 82 (Dec. 31, 1980), [1980]
5 LAB. L. REP. 117,712; Weather Tamer, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. No. 36 (Dec. 12, 1980), [1980]
5 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 17,672; Valley Cabinet & Mfg., Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. No. 8 (Nov. 7,
1980), [1980] 5 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 117,517; Motor Convoy, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 175
(Nov. 21, 1980), [1980] 5 LAB. L. REp. (CCH) 17,619; Taylor-Dunn Mfg. Co., 252
N.L.R.B. No. 118 (Oct. 31, 1980), [1980] 5 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 9117,474; Herman Bros., 252
N.L.R.B. No. 121 (Nov. 14, 1980), [1980] 5 LAB. L. RaP. (CCH) 117,593; Behring Int'l Inc.,
252 N.L.R.B. No. 55, (Oct. 17, 1980), [1980] 5 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 1 17,447.
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the perceived imbalance of economic power between labor and
management.2 °9 Congress achieved redress by granting affirma-
tive rights to employees and placing certain enumerated restric-
tions on employers' activities.210 The NLRA prohibits acts which
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their
rights to organize a union, bargain collectively, and strike. A judi-
cial gloss sanctioning employer conduct violative of the NLRA
unequivocally contradicts congressional intent.2 1
V. CONCLUSION
The controversy surrounding the mixed motive analysis may
be quelled to a certain extent by the Wright Line decision. The
perceived extremes represented by the dominant motive and in
part tests appear in equilibrium with the adoption of the Mt.
Healthy analysis. Differing interpretations concerning the precise
burden placed on the employer,212 in addition to the uncertain
range of cases in which the test will apply, however, may create
yet another point of contention between the Board and the
circuits.
BRADLEY C. ELROD
209. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965).
210. Id.
211. See also supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 27-28 & 202 and accompanying text.
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